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This paper develops an equilibrium model of the annuities market where agents have 
private information about their mortality, and where the predictive value of this 
information decays over time. The paper shows that in this case, insurance companies 
will observe a duration-related trend in the mortality of annuitants under certain 
conditions. This effect is tested for using a Cox proportional hazards methodology and 
data from the South African annuities market, which since the early 1990’s has permitted 
phased withdrawals of retirement savings instead of mandating pure annuitisation. 
Evidence is equivocal: substantial differences are found between the duration-related 
mortality trends of different insurance companies, data problems seem to have some 
effect, and factors outside the model which might change the results cannot be excluded. 
However, the presence of a strong duration-related trend cannot be decisively rejected. 
The observed trend indicates that mortality at earlier policy durations is better than at 
later durations by the equivalent of about 6 years of age, although data factors cannot be 
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Private annuity markets are an important area of study for economists.  Annuities are 
relevant to many different aspects of economic behaviour - including the demand for 
insurance, asymmetric information, bequest motives, and investment and consumption 
behaviour.   The shift in many countries from defined benefit to defined contribution 
pension plans, which will continue to reduce the proportion of assets held by future 
retirees that is already annuitised, gives greater importance to the study of private annuity 
markets.  Yaari (1965) pointed out the tremendous insurance benefits that annuities offer 
purchasers.  These benefits are so large that simple models predict they should be 
prepared to sacrifice a large fraction of their wealth in order to purchase annuities.  Yet, 
in virtually every country, individuals need to be forced to purchase annuities.  Various 
explanations have been offered for this.  These include the fact that individuals are able to 
insure themselves against living too long because they are married or because they have 
children who will support them in old age (Brown and Poterba, 2000), the presence of 
bequest motives (Bernheim, 1991), the fact that a large fraction of wealth is pre-
annuitised anyway (Mitchell et al., 1999), and precautionary motives that might cause 
individuals to prefer liquid assets over annuities, such as the possibility of health shocks 
(Brown, 2001).  A summary of this literature can be found in McCarthy and Neuberger 
(2003). 
 
One other factor that is often cited to explain low annuity purchase rates is that 
asymmetric information causes a failure in the annuities market.  The theory states that 
individuals have private knowledge about their longevity.  Individuals who perceive that 
annuities are better value - i.e. those who believe that they will live for a long time - will 
purchase more annuities than those who do not - which will cause annuities to be more 
expensive than they would be if everyone had no knowledge about their longevity or if 
insurance companies were able to measure the information that people had about their 
own longevity absolutely perfectly.   Various studies (e.g. McCarthy and Mitchell, 2002) 
have documented the lower mortality of annuity purchasers relative to the general 
population in virtually every annuity market.  However, commentators remain divided about the extent to which this difference is the result of asymmetric information in the 
annuities market or merely a reflection of the different characteristics of annuity 
purchasers that are, at least in principle, observable, such as wealth and employment 
status.  This distinction may have important implications for economic policy on 
mandating annuity purchase from individual account-type pension schemes.   
 
This study uses a new data set and a novel technique to test for the presence of adverse 
selection in the South African annuities market.  The South African annuities market is 
an interesting case study for reasons which will be discussed below.  Section 2 will 
discuss the theory underlying the method used to test for adverse selection, section 3 will 
discuss the data used in more detail and section 4 will present results.  Section 5 will be a 
conclusion. 
 
2.  Theory 
 
Several techniques have been used to test for adverse selection in insurance and annuities 
markets.  Three papers are Cawley and Philipson (1999), Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) 
and Mitchell and McCarthy (2002).    The method adopted here bears closest 
resemblance to Finkelstein and Poterba (2002).  Cawley and Philipson (1999) use data 
from the US life insurance market.  They test for various implications of a Rothschild-
Stiglitz-type separating equilibrium in the life insurance market: a positive relationship 
between self-perceived risk and the price of insurance, the absence of bulk discounts, a 
negative relationship between risk and quantity of insurance purchased and the prediction 
that individuals should hold only one insurance contract.  They find convincing evidence 
that none of these predictions hold in their data and conclude that the Rothschild-Stiglitz 
theory does not apply to the US life insurance market.  Finkelstein and Poterba (1999) 
test for adverse selection in the UK annuities market.  They demonstrate that purchasers 
of different annuity products in the UK have different mortality risk profiles, and show 
that these differences are priced into the annuity products.  They take this as evidence that 
there is a separating equilibrium in the UK life annuities market, by product type.   
McCarthy and Mitchell (2002) illustrate that purchasers of annuities have different mortality profiles to the general population in most countries where annuities are sold, 
and that there are regular patterns to these differences across countries.  Neither of the 
two papers that deal with annuities markets is able to demonstrate that the difference 
between the mortality profiles of purchasers of different annuity types (or of purchasers 
and non-purchasers) is the result of asymmetric information or of factors that may be 
correlated with unobserved factors underlying the decision to purchase an annuity, such 
as risk aversion, wealth, and the presence of a bequest motive.   
 
This paper uses a different methodology to test for asymmetric information.  The effect 
underlying the test is the decline in the predictive value of a given set of information over 
time.  This decline is probably best understood by an example: the level of the stock 
market today tells one a great deal about the level of the stock market tomorrow, but it 
tells one almost nothing about the level of the stock market in 20 years.   A similar 
example is the information that insurance companies collect during underwriting about 
the likely mortality of individuals who apply for life insurance.  Individuals who pass a 
certain health standard are permitted to buy insurance at standard rates, other individuals 
are not.  The predictive power of this information on mortality rates is initially high but 
declines over time.  In the case of insurance, one can actually observe the effect: 
individuals who have recently purchased their insurance policies have lighter mortality 
than those who are identical in every other respect save for the fact that they purchased 
their insurance policies earlier.  An example of this effect, taken from real data collected 
from life insurance companies in the United Kingdom, is shown in Figure 1.  It shows the 
mortality of life insurance purchasers aged 50 who purchased their insurance policies at 
age 50, 46-49 and before age 46.  The procession of fitted mortality is then shown as the 
different individuals age.  Initially, recent purchasers of life insurance have mortality very 
much lighter than the average for all those who are their age who have purchased 
insurance, but that this difference gets smaller as individuals age.  One explanation for 
this effect is due to the decline in the value of the information that the insurance company 
collected about the individual’s state of health at the time of purchase, for explaining the 
health status of the individual many years later.   Of course, it is also possible that some 
other factor correlated with mortality and the decision to purchase insurance declines in a similar way.  For instance, it might be that wealthy individuals purchase insurance and 
that if one is wealthy when one purchases insurance it says relatively little about whether 
one will be wealthy in the future.  Also, another factor may be operating in the life 
insurance market:  because individuals do not commit to purchase insurance indefinitely, 
but can choose to lapse their policies if they so wish, it may be that individuals with 
lower probabilities of dying have less need for insurance and so selectively lapse their 
policies.  Of course, one needs to posit some factor that explains why they only realise 
this after they have purchased the policy as opposed to before! 
 
However, the example raises an interesting question: if we make the assumption that the 
private information one had about one’s mortality at a certain point becomes less and less 
useful at predicting one’s mortality as one ages, what implication does this have for the 
observed pattern of mortality in a pool of annuitants?  In the next few paragraphs, we 
formalise some of the ideas discussed here and answer this question. 
 
To model this effect, let us assume that we have a continuum of individuals.  Individuals 
differ from each other in two ways: some people are healthy (type h) and some are 
unhealthy (type u), and each individual has a fixed parameter ￿ which affects how willing 
they are to annuitise their assets, which will be discussed later.   Other than this, 
individuals are initially assumed to be identical to each other. 
 
Assume that healthy individuals can either become unhealthy (with probability ￿) or die 
(with probability h q ) in each period.  Similarly, unhealthy individuals can either become 
healthy (with probability ￿) or die (with probability u q ) in each period.  Assume that 
these probabilities are independent of ￿, and that they remain constant until all 
individuals in a given cohort are dead.  An illustration of this model is shown in Figure 2.   
We could introduce a time trend in the mortality probabilities to mimic the effect of 
population ageing, but this would add unnecessary complications. 
 Assume that individuals know their own type but that this is private information:  
outsiders cannot observe what type they are.  Each individual’s ￿ is also assumed to be 
private information.   
 
Under certain very mild conditions discussed in appendix A, in this model there exists a 
steady state proportion of individuals who are healthy, which, once reached, will not 
change from year to year.  Let us assume that these mild conditions hold, and that the 
proportion of individuals who are healthy is at the steady state, p.  This is simply 
equivalent to saying that, over time, the proportion of individuals in our population who 
are classified as healthy or unhealthy (relative to their peers) does not change.  This is 
slightly artificial, but given that the emphasis of the model is on relative health within a 
given population, rather than on some absolute standard of health, it is not too onerous. 
 
Into this environment, we introduce a market for life annuities which pay constant units 
of consumption until the death of the individual, and we offer a one-off option to 
purchase a life annuity to all population members.  The parameter ￿ affects each 
individual’s demand for annuities.  For convenience, suppose that ￿ represents the fixed 
cost of purchasing an annuity - it could equally represent a bequest motive, or the extent 
to which the individual’s wealth is pre-annuitised.  Assume that the distribution of ￿ in 
the population of healthy and unhealthy people is identical, and that each individual’s ￿ 
does not change over time.  Let ￿ be defined over the range [0, ￿max], and let the 
distribution of ￿ be represented by the density function  q p .   The fact that ￿ is private 
information implies that individuals do not reveal their health type to annuity companies 
when they purchase annuities.   
 
Let  h a  denote the present value of a life annuity for an individual who is in the ‘healthy’ 
state and let  u a  denote the present value of an annuity for an individual who is currently 
‘unhealthy’.  Note that these values do not depend on the age of the individual as our 
individuals are assumed not to age.  Assume for convenience that the risk free interest 
rate is constant equal to r, and that the annuity payments are made at the end of each time 
period rather than continuously.    
To derive formulae for the expected discounted present value of annuities for individuals 
who are currently healthy ( h a ) and unhealthy ( u a ), we note that if the healthy individual 
is alive at the end of the first period (probability,  h q - 1 ), we need to pay him an annuity 
payment of 1.  If the individual is healthy (probability,  h q - -l 1 ), the value  h a  will be 
sufficient to buy out all future annuity payments.  If the individual is unhealthy, 
(probability ￿) then the value  u a  will be sufficient to buy out all future payments, while if 
the individual is dead, (probability  h q ) then the value of all future payments will be 0. 
 
This reasoning, and similar reasoning for the case of the individual who is currently 
unhealthy, yields a set of simultaneous equations in  u a  and  h a : 
h u h h h h q a q a q a r × + × + - - × + - × = + 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( l l        (1) 
u h u u u u q a q a q a r × + × + - - × + - × = + 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( h h   
These equations can be solved to yield the following equations for  u a  and  h a : 
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By taking simple differences, it will be seen that  u h r h q q a a < Û >  as we would expect.   
 
The implication of this is that the expected discounted present value of a level annuity in 
the hands of a currently healthy individual is worth more than the same annuity in the 
hands of a currently unhealthy individual.   
 
Now, if we make the assumption that the insurance company cannot observe the total 
quantity of annuities that an individual has purchased then a separating equilibrium in the 
annuities market, along the lines of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), is impossible.  This is 
because their result depends on the insurance company being able to observe the value of 
the loss and the quantity of insurance purchased.  Following Abel (1986), we therefore must have a pooling equilibrium.  Each insurance company must charge a single price for 
annuities, and assuming a competitive market, each must charge the value that will 
ensure that it makes no profit.  If we assume that the proportion of individuals of a given 
cohort who purchase annuities who are in healthy is 0 , h x , and that the proportion of 
individuals of a given cohort who purchase annuities who are in poor health is 
0 , 0 , 1 h u x x - = , then the single price charged by the insurance company must be: 
u u h h u h h h h a a a x a a x a x a ³ - + = - + = ) ( ) 1 ( 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , .         
Similarly, it can be shown that:              (3) 
h u h u h u u h u a a a x a a x a x a £ - - = + - = ) ( ) 1 ( 0 , 0 , 0 , . 
 
Now we present an annuity demand model for each type of individual.  Let the expected 
discounted total utility of a healthy individual who optimises consumption at each future 
time point, conditional on an equilibrium annuity price a, non-annuitised wealth w and 
amount of annuity purchased, ￿, be denoted:  
, , { }
0
( , | ) max ( ( ) ( ))
i
i i i
h hh h i hu u i C
i
V w a E p u C p u C a b
¥
=
= + ￿ ,        (4) 
where 
i
hh p is the probability that an individual healthy at time 0 is still healthy at time i, 
and similarly for 
i
hu p , and  i h C , is optimal consumption if individual is healthy at time i, 
and  i u C , is optimal consumption if the individual is unhealthy at time i, and ￿ is the 
individual’s discount factor.   When individuals decide how much to consume, they take 
into account three state variables: the amount of wealth they have on hand (w), the 
amount of annuity income they receive (￿) and their state of health.  Consumption in each 
period is constrained to be less than wealth in that period.  All the individual’s wealth is 
invested in an asset that pays a risk-free return of r per period.  Hence, the individual’s 
wealth at time i, denoted  i W , follows the following process:  
a + + - = + ) 1 )( ( 1 r C W W i i i .              (5) 
At time 0, the individual exchanges  q a + a units of wealth for an annuity that pays an 
annual payment of a .  If the individual chooses not to annuitise any wealth, then they do 
not pay the fixed cost ￿.  The optimal values of ￿ for individuals in different states are 
therefore given by:  
0 0 ˆ ( , ) argmax ( 1 , | ) h h a V w a a a a a q a q a > = - - , and 0 0 ˆ ( , ) argmax ( 1 , | ) u u a V w a a a a a q a q a > = - - .         (6) 
We assume that  0 ) , ( ˆ max = q a a h : in other words, there is at least one healthy individual 
for whom purchasing an annuity is so expensive that the optimal purchase amount is 0.  
Further, we know from Yaari (1965) that  a W a h / ) 0 , ( ˆ 0 = a : given annuities that are at 
least fairly priced, individuals will annuitise all their wealth in simple models like this if 




Our agents choose consumption according to the following program: 
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Remembering that the level of a is given, the Bellman equations for the agents in each 
state are: 
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Differentiating with respect to  ) , ( a w Cu  and  ) , ( a w Ch  gives the first order conditions of 
each equation, and setting these equal to 0 for a maximum yields the following two 
equations: 
) , ) 1 ))( , ( (( ) 1 )( 1 ( )) , ( ( '
' a a a h b a + + - + - - = r w C w V r q w C u u u u u  
             ) , ) 1 ))( , ( (( ) 1 (
' a a a bh + + - + + r w C w V r u h       (9) 
) , ) 1 ))( , ( (( ) 1 )( 1 ( )) , ( ( '
' a a a l b a + + - + - - = r w C w V r q w C u h h h h  
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' a a a bl + + - + + r w C w V r h u        However, using the envelope theorem to differentiate the Bellman equations w.r.t. w 
yields: 
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Combining these equations with the first order conditions yields: 
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Since these hold for all levels of wealth, these imply that: 
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Substituting these four identities into the first order conditions yields the Euler equations 
that a solution to the dynamic programming problem must satisfy: 
)) , ) 1 ))( , ( (( ( ' ) 1 )( 1 ( )) , ( ( ' a a a h b a + + - + - - = r w C w C u r q w C u u u u u  
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This is a pair of simultaneous equations in the functions  ) , ( a w Cu  and  ) , ( a w Ch .  If the 
value of ￿ is less than  1 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) min( , )
u h q r q r - + - +  then the value function will be finite and the conditions of the verification theorem will hold
1.  Hence a solution to (11) will be a 
solution to the overall problem.  Unfortunately, it is well known that no analytic solution 
for a problem of this type exists owing to the borrowing constraint on wealth and the 
infinite time horizon
2.  Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) have demonstrated analytic 
solutions to similar problems (with only one health state) where the time horizon is finite 
and there are no borrowing constraints.       
 
Some insight about the properties of these functions can be derived from considering a 
pair of equations similar to (13), but where individuals do not switch from type to type, 
that is, where  0 l h = = :  
 
' ( ( , )) (1 )(1 ) ' ( (( ( , ))(1 ) , )) u u u u u C w q r u C w C w r a b a a a = - + - + +     (14) 
' ( ( , )) (1 )(1 ) ' ( (( ( , ))(1 ) , )) h h h h u C w q r u C w C w r a b a a a = - + - + +  
 
Here we have two independent problems.  Since  1 1
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) min( , )
u h q r q r b - + - + < , the 
verification theorem will hold for both problems.  It is relatively easy to see that, for all 
levels of w and ￿,  ( , ) ( , ) u h C w C w a a >  owing to the fact that  h u q q < , which implies that 
the individual in state u discounts the future more heavily than the individual in state h.    
Since the functions  ( , ) u C w a  and  ( , ) h C w a  change continuously with l  and ￿, we can 
                                                 
1  See the first chapter of Fleming and Mete Soner (1991) for details. 
2  If the discount rates are allowed to differ by state of health, and  
1
[(1 )(1 )]
h h r q b
-
= + -  and 
1
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u u h r q b b
-
= + - <  then it can be verified that a solution to the above equations for all concave utility 
functions  is given by: 
1
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u h C w C w rw r a a a
-
= = + + .    
Even though the verification theorem does not hold in this case (the value functions will be infinite), this is 
a solution to the above problem as can be seen by solving a finite-horizon problem and allowing the time to 
tend to infinity.  The rest of this section assumes that this approach has been adopted.  In this model, 
ˆ ˆ ( , ) ( , ) ,
h u a a a q a q a q = " .  This implies that, 
,0 h x , the proportion of individuals who choose to purchase 
annuities who are healthy, is equal to p, the steady-state proportion of healthy individuals in the population.  
The equilibrium annuity price in this model is therefore  (1 )
h u a pa p a = + - .  Also, 
0 ,t x p =  implies that 
, h t x p t = " , from the definition of p.  Therefore there will be no duration-related trend in the average 
observed mortality of annuity purchasers, as we would expect.   
 see that  ( , ) ( , ) u h C w C w a a >  for at least a neighbourhood of ( , ) l h  around (0,0).  
Intuitively, we can see that the two equations  ( , ) u C w a  and  ( , ) h C w a  must become more 
similar as l  and ￿ increase, and since if  max 1 h q l l = = -  and  max 1 u q h h = = -  (in other 
words, individuals alternate between different states in each period) then  ( , ) u C w a is still 
greater than  ( , ) h C w a  for all w and ￿, owing to the higher mortality probability in state u.   
 
Similarly, in the main problem, we must have  ( , ) ( , ) u h C w C w a a > for all admissible 
values of l  and ￿: unhealthy individuals consume more that all levels of wealth and 
annuitisation than healthy individuals, as they have higher mortality probabilities and 
there are no bequest motives.   Anything else would result in a contradiction.  From 
equation (11), and the concavity of the utility function u this implies that 
' ' ( , ) ' ( ( , )) ' ( ( , )) ( , ) u u h h V w u C w u C w V w a a a a = < = : healthy individuals value an extra unit 
of wealth more highly than unhealthy individuals.    
 
From this we can extract the conclusion we need.  Two effects will affect annuity 
purchase behaviour: the wealth effect and the substitution effect.  In a previous section 
we have shown that the wealth effect is unambiguous: healthy people will value a given 
annuity at a given price more highly than unhealthy people.  The result we have shown 
here about the consumption functions of healthy and unhealthy people shows that 
unhealthy individuals will value a level annuity weakly less than healthy individuals 
because they would prefer an annuity with more steeply decreasing payments, and they 
may have more difficulty than healthy people (because of borrowing constraints) in 
altering their consumption pattern sufficiently to undo the undesirable payment pattern in 
the level annuity with a given present value.   Therefore both effects are unambiguous: in 
the absence of constraints on the amount of annuities that can be purchased, healthy 
individuals will purchase more level annuities than unhealthy individuals
3.   
 
                                                 
3  Brown (2003) examines the issue of annuity demand with mortality heterogeneity and finds that poorer 
people find the insurance element of annuities to be greater than richer people, to some extent canceling out 
the wealth effect.  In this paper we are assuming that wealth is the same across mortality types.  The 
description here may need to be made more precise, especially if wealth is allowed to differ. However, we assume that agents are constrained in the amount of annuities they can 
purchase.  We assume that they cannot spend more than their total wealth buying 
annuities, and we assume that they cannot sell annuities rather than buy them.  This has 
the implication that we may only observe the difference in annuity purchases of healthy 
and unhealthy individuals for some of our population.  If, however, we assume that ￿ 
range is large enough to ensure that at least one healthy individual will annuitise their 
entire wealth and that at least one healthy individual will annuitise none of it (as we do in 
a previous section), then we will observe at least one value of ￿ for which a healthy 
individual will purchase annuities and an unhealthy individual will not.  This implies that, 
in equilibrium, p xh > 0 , , the steady state proportion of healthy individuals in the 
population. 
  
We have therefore demonstrated that there exists a pooling equilibrium in this annuities 
market; that the equilibrium annuity price lies in the range  ] ; [ h u a a , and that, if the 
distribution of ￿ and wealth is the same in healthy and unhealthy individuals,  0 , h x , the 
proportion of individuals who choose to purchase annuities who are healthy, is greater 
than p, the steady-state proportion of healthy individuals.     
 
Given that this is the case, what will the insurance company observe to the mortality of 
individuals who have purchased annuities in this case?  Let  1 , h x  be the proportion of 
individuals who bought annuities one year ago who are healthy.  Following the derivation 
of the value of p in the appendix, we note that: 
) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
] | [
0 , 0 ,
0 , 0 ,
0 , 1 ,
u h h h
h h h
h h q x q x
x x q
x x E
- - + -
- + - -
@
h l
          (15) 
given that the number of individuals who purchased annuities at time 0 is large. 
 
By mild assumptions described in appendix A, there will be a non-oscillating progression 
of  t h x , back to p.  This implies that the observed mortality of a cohort of annuity 
purchasers will tend back to the steady state mortality level from a lower level, again 
provided that there are sufficient annuity purchasers.  Obviously, because the population was in the steady state before the option to purchase the annuity was offered, the 
mortality of the population who chose not to purchase the annuity will start at a higher 
level and gradually revert to the steady state: the population viewed as a whole will 
remain in the steady state, but there will be systematic differences between the mortality 
of purchasers and non-purchasers that will exactly cancel each other out. 
 
Therefore we have demonstrated that the presence of asymmetric information whose 
value decays in an annuities market in which there is a pooling equilibrium will cause an 
increase in the observed mortality of a cohort of annuity purchasers, independent of any 
ageing effect.  This effect is caused by the decline in the predictive power of the 
individual’s health status at the time they purchase the annuity, for their health status 
many years later.  The decline in observed mortality happens despite the fact that the 
annuity purchasers are forward-looking, rational purchasers who are fully informed about 
the process their mortality follows, and despite the fact that the insurance company 
charges the equilibrium price for the annuity.    
 
Before applying this model to real data, several observations are important.  The first is 
that if all the asymmetric information about mortality has a predictive value that does not 
decline over time, then the effect modelled here will not be observed, despite the 
existence of asymmetric information.  This implies that the model can only be regarded 
as a test for asymmetric information whose predictive value declines over time.  In our 
model, mortality information whose predictive value does not decline over time might be 
modelled by assuming that individuals remain type h or type u their entire lives.  Both 
types of asymmetric information are reasonable in the context of annuities: asymmetric 
information about mortality whose predictive value does not decline might be the age at 
which your parents died, while asymmetric information which does become less valuable 
might be the fact that you were in hospital with pneumonia at age 55.  Secondly, annuity 
contracts are permanent: individuals cannot withdraw from them, which implies that they 
do not have the opportunity to adjust their annuity holdings downwards in response to 
flows of new information, particularly bad news about their health.  This makes the 
annuities market suitable for testing for the presence of asymmetric information whose predictive power declines with time.  A third point to note is that this test might pick up 
other duration-related effects unrelated to asymmetric information.  For instance, if, the 
longer an individual is retired, the more likely they are to die, regardless of age, this may 
show up in our data and result in a false result.   
 
It is also useful to examine the issue of correlation between the mortality type of an 
individual (h or u) and the propensity of an individual to purchase annuities (￿).  If the 
distribution of ￿ differs between healthy and unhealthy individuals, then we can no longer 
conclude that a positive duration-related trend in annuitant mortality implies that 
asymmetric information about mortality is present.  For instance, if we assume that 
healthy individuals are more likely to purchase annuities than unhealthy individuals, even 
if there is no asymmetric information used in insurance purchases (for instance, if 
individuals themselves were ignorant of their health type) then there would be a duration-
related trend of annuitant mortality in our model.  This effect has prevented previous 
studies of asymmetric information in annuities markets from reaching definitive 
conclusions, and regretfully it limits the generality of our model too,   
     
3.  Data 
 
This section will discuss the data used in the study, and the insurance environment in 
South Africa, where the data comes from.   South Africa is a middle-income developing 
country situated on the southern tip of Africa.  The South African Reserve Bank (2003) 
reports that South Africa’s 2002 GDP was approximately US$160 billion (in PPP terms it 
is around 2.5 times that, by UNDP figures, although estimates of this vary (see UNDP, 
2004)).  The population of South Africa was 44.7 million according to the most recent 
census, conducted in October 2001 (Statistics SA, 2003a).   This implies that GDP per 
capita was around $3500 per head per year in 2002, and around $8000 per head per year 
in PPP terms.  According to the South African Reserve Bank (2003), the South African 
GDP is made up roughly of 12% primary industry such as mining, forestry and 
agriculture, 24% manufacturing and construction and 64% services such as financial 
intermediation, wholesale and retail trade and personal services.  The life insurance industry in South Africa is very large: insurance premiums to life insurance companies 
were about US$18 billion in 2002, around 11% of GDP (Life Offices Association of 
South Africa, 2003).  This is divided into individual premiums of around US$10 billion 
and group premiums of around $8 billion per year.    
 
One of the reasons that life insurance premiums are such a large part of GDP is that 
South Africa’s state old-age benefit is a non-contributory means-tested pension fixed at a 
very low level (currently around US$100 per month).  Individuals who wish to consume 
more than this level in retirement are forced to make their own provision for this, and the 
large life insurance sector has grown to meet this need.   More information on the state 
pension system in South Africa can be obtained from the South African Department of 
Social Development (2003) and from Case and Deaton (1998). 
 
In South Africa, tax incentives are given for saving through pension arrangements, which 
typically take the form of either a personal pension or IRA (called a ‘Retirement Annuity’ 
in South Africa), or an occupational pension, which is either of the defined benefit or 
defined contribution variety.  South Africa began the shift from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pension plans in the early 1980’s, which implies that there are significant 
numbers of people who have already retired from defined contribution pension schemes.    
 
In South Africa, members of defined contribution pension plans or holders of IRA’s are 
required to purchase an annuity with 2/3 of their accumulated account balance on 
retirement.  The other 1/3 is paid as a lump sum, partly tax free.  The range of annuity 
products whose purchase is permitted is very large indeed.  There are two main groups of 
permitted products: ‘traditional’ annuities, and ‘living annuities’.  ‘Traditional’ annuities 
include single life and joint-and-survivor annuities (which may be level or escalating), 
annuities where the annuity payment is guaranteed for the first few years of the contract, 
regardless of whether the individual lives or dies, annuities which return a portion of the 
capital on death, impaired-life annuities and with-profits annuities, where the annual 
annuity payment is linked in some way to the returns on a portfolio of underlying assets.  
‘Living annuities’, on the other hand, are more like phased withdrawals than annuities: the individual has complete investment choice, there is no transfer of mortality risk, and 
withdrawals are fairly flexible.  In a living annuity, each purchaser’s assets are invested 
in a separate account.  The purchaser can choose the asset mix, which may include 
equities, bonds, cash and even shares of commercial real estate portfolios, and change it 
frequently.  Some providers permit international investments, subject to some 
restrictions.   The purchaser must take a monthly pension from the account, whose annual 
value must be between 5% and 20% of the accumulated fund value at the last policy 
anniversary.  (Historically, South Africa has had relatively high interest rates: currently, 
long-term government bonds yield around 8.5% to maturity, their lowest in at least two 
decades).  Each year, the purchaser can decide on a new pension level.  When the 
purchaser dies, the funds remaining in the account do not revert to the insurance 
company, but form part of his or her estate.  The policy cannot be surrendered unless the 
accumulated funds are transferred to a similar policy with another provider.  In a ‘living 
annuity’ there is therefore no mortality risk pooling: the obligation is entirely on the 
purchaser to ensure that he or she outlives his assets.  These policies are called annuities 
in order to attract the favourable tax treatment accorded to annuities in South Africa and 
in order to be eligible for compulsory purchase by members of DC pension plans.   They 
have been sold in South Africa since the early 1990’s.   Their introduction was at least 
confirmed by a government Commission of Inquiry into the South African tax system 
which commenced in 1994, and which found that the state had little interest in 
differentiating between products that paid lump sums and products that paid a lifetime 
income to retirees
4.  This is not surprising given the relatively low level of the state old 
age pension in South Africa. 
 
The option to purchase such a broad range of products has implications for adverse 
selection in the traditional annuities market.  If a purchaser believes that he or she is 
relatively more healthy than average, then he or she can elect to purchase a life annuity.  
However, those who are less healthy than average might prefer to purchase a living 
annuity, because they will be able to bequeath any assets they are unable to consume 
                                                 
4  The enquiry was chaired by Michael Katz.  His complete report can be found online at the South African 
Treasury website: http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/katz/default.htm during their lifetime, or because they may consume assets outside the annuity policy and 
bequeath assets that remain inside it.  We might therefore expect that if the effects of the 
asymmetric information on mortality are temporary, as modelled in the previous section, 
we would observe a duration-related increase in mortality rates amongst purchasers of 
life annuities, after controlling for age, and gender.  Controlling for age is necessary 
because mortality exhibits a predictable increase with age.  Women also have lower 
mortality than men.  What we therefore wish to test for is a difference between the 
mortality of purchasers of the same age and gender who retired and purchased their 
annuities at different ages.  If there is a significant increase in mortality with both 
duration and age, this could be evidence of asymmetric information about mortality in the 
annuities market. 
 
To test for this effect, data was collected from two South African insurance companies.  
The policies collected were all life annuity policies in force at those companies at any 
point between the beginning of 1997 and the end of 2002 for the one company and the 
beginning of 1998 and the end of 2002 for the other company.  Three filters were applied 
to the data.  Firstly, joint-and-survivor policies, voluntary purchase annuities, or any kind 
of with-profits annuities were excluded from the analysis for all years.  Secondly, 
annuities where the purchaser was younger than 55 or older than 85 were excluded only 
in the years where this was the case.  This was to restrict the data to the age range of 
interest, and to restrict the number of variables to estimate.  At ages above 85 there was 
very little data in any case.  There were fewer than 5 policies where there were such 
severe data errors in processing that it was not possible to include them in the analysis in 
an obvious way.  There were also some policies where the date of death was recorded 
during the investigation period but where the death actually occurred before the 
investigation period began.  Both of these groups of policies were excluded from the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1 shows various characteristics of the data.  These exclusions left 123482 policies 
in the sample.  The total number of deaths observed in the sample over the observation 
period was 13299, and the total number of life-years observed was 493313.6 years.  Around 68% of the policies were held by males, and around 31% of the policies came 
from one of the two companies and the remainder from the other.   For technical reasons, 
the data extract only contained the age of each policyholder in whole years and the 
month, rather than the date of death.  For reasons of convenience, it was therefore 
assumed that the birthday and the policy anniversary occurred at the same time.     
 
An examination of the data by year of inception shows an interesting trend.  Treating 
each policy as a unit of analysis (rather than each policy year), it can be seen that the 
annual number of annuities sold by these two companies in this category is small, but 
stable over time.  It is difficult to obtain accurate figures about the size of the entire South 
African annuities market, and therefore it is not clear whether this implies that the market 
for life annuities is growing or contracting.  Given the change in policy, it would be 
interesting if the proportion of retirees who annuitised their savings remained constant at 
a relatively high level, given the unwillingness of people elsewhere in the world to 
annuitise their assets.  A study of the effects of the policy change on annuitisation 
behaviour would be extremely interesting. 
  
Table 2 shows summary statistics for this data by policy-year, rather than by policy as 
was shown in Table 1.  In this data set, each policy has one record for each policy year or 
part-policy year that it remains in the investigation. 
  
A conceptual representation of the structure of our data is illustrated in Figure 3.  
Duration cells are shown on the vertical axis and age cells are shown on the horizontal 
axis.  Individuals, shown as diagonal lines, enter the analysis either when the 
investigation period begins, or when they purchase a policy.  They leave the investigation 
either when they die (marked with a cross) or the investigation ends (marked with a 
circle).   With the passage of time, they move diagonally through increasing age and 
duration cells.  Owing to the fact that birthdays are not recorded in our data, and our 
assumption that policy anniversaries occur exactly on birthdays, each individual (marked 
by the diagonal arrows) exits age and duration cells simultaneously.  This assumption 
will have no effect on our final analysis beyond making the estimated mortality at each age applicable to people who are, on average, half a year older assuming that birthdays 
are evenly distributed across the calendar year.   This effect is unimportant for our 
purposes.  For example, in the figure, individual A purchases a policy aged x exactly at 
the beginning of the investigation and survives all the way through to the end.  The 
dashed line marked A￿  shows the effect of our assumption about age: in our data, 
individual A is indistinguishable from individual A￿, even though he is actually nearly 1 
year younger than A￿ (although he purchases his policy at the same time, and, like A￿, 
survives to the end of the investigation).  Individual B purchases a policy aged x+2 mid-
way through the investigation and survives until the end.  Individual C was present in the 
analysis at the beginning of the investigation, aged x+1, but died in the middle of his 
second policy year, aged x+2. 
 
Figure 4a shows a histogram of the number of life-years in the data set separated by age 
and duration.  It can be seen from the graph that the age distribution of policies at 
inception is highly lumpy, with most annuities being purchased at the round ages 55, 60, 
65 and 70.  The modal age at inception in this data is 55 years old.   This lumpy 
retirement pattern has remained constant for at least 10 years in this data, as can be seen 
from the length of the parallel diagonal peaks in the data displayed.  In the second panel, 
labelled Figure 4b, the graph has been rotated to illustrate the effect of the lumpy 
inception age on the age-duration structure of the data.  In the shorter term, these peaks 
are caused by individuals aging and policy duration increasing simultaneously as in the 
theoretical representation.  The peaks are slightly more pronounced than they would be if 
the actual birthday and the actual policy anniversary had been used as opposed to 
approximations described above.   
 
Figure 5 shows the logarithm of the crude death rate in each duration-age cell, calculated 
as the number of deaths observed in each cell divided by the number of life-years in each 
cell.   The increase in mortality rates with age shows up clearly as a decline in the 
negative logarithm of the crude death rate; however, it is less clear that there is any effect 
by duration.   However, the graph masks the fact that in many of the cells there is not very much data and therefore the crude death rates are very variable in many cells.   We 
therefore use an econometric method to test for any duration-related trend in mortality. 
 
4.  Regression Analysis 
 
A more precise estimate of the effect of increasing age and duration on mortality can be 
obtained by using the Cox proportional hazards regression methodology, described in 
Cox (1972).  This fits a model to the hazard rate  ) , ( x t h , where  ) , ( x t h  is given by the 
following: 







= .                (16) 
In this case,  ) , ( x t F  is the survival distribution function of individuals, and  ) , ( x t f  the 
corresponding density function.  The Cox proportional hazards model assumes that all 
hazards are proportional to a base-line hazard rate,  ) ( 0 t h , in the following way: 
  ) ... exp( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 0 n nx x t h x t h b b + + = .            (17) 
The model, as its name and formula suggest, assumes that the hazard rates of different 
populations are proportional to one another, or, equivalently, that the survival functions 
form a family of Lehmann alternatives (in other words that they are powers of one 
another), an assumption which can be tested.
 5   The method can be implemented with 
both tied failure times (as we will have in this data owing to the fact that dates of death 
are only recorded monthly), and time-varying covariates. The method does not explicitly 
estimate the baseline hazard function  ) ( 0 t h , although this can be estimated by other 
methods.  This has the implication that an omitted category is not strictly necessary, but 
that time trends in hazard ratios need to be interpreted carefully. 
 
As a further approximation, we treat age and duration as constants between the time that 
they change, effectively assuming that these covariates change discretely rather than 
continuously.  Note also that the data is censored: each individual spends a maximum of 
                                                 
5  See Miller (1981) for more information about the Cox proportional hazards model. 1 year in each duration-age cell before either moving on to the next cell, dying, or the 
investigation being terminated, as shown in Figure 3.   
 
We use sets of dummy variables for age and duration.  To lower the number of 
categories, we lump all policies with duration greater than 15 into one category, and use 
this as the omitted category.  The omitted age category is age 71.  We also have dummies 
for gender (we omit females), for company and for calendar year (1996 is omitted) to 
capture any effects related to these variables.  To control for wealth, which affects 
mortality, we include the annual annuity payment in 2002 South African Rands.  The 
annual payments of annuities purchased in earlier years were grossed up using the South 
African Consumer Price Index, available from Statistics South Africa (2003b)
6.   




STATA has implemented the Cox proportional hazards estimation procedure for data 
with discretely time-varying covariates.   The results do not appear to be sensitive to the 
method assumed for dealing with tied failure times in the data.   The hazard ratios for 
dummy variables show the estimated ratio between the hazard rate when the variable is 1 
to when the variable is 0.   
 
First results are shown in Table 2.   The 
2 c  test shows that the model as a whole is very 
significant, as we would expect with such a large amount of data.  The estimated hazard 
ratio for males is 2.110209 and highly significant.  This shows, as expected, that males 
have much higher mortality than females: in this data set the hazard rate of men is 
estimated to be double that of women.  The logarithm of the amount of the annual income 
is also extremely significant.  A 2.78-times increase in the annual income from an annuity 
policy lowers the hazard rate by a factor of 0.9524708, as we would expect: richer people 
who can afford bigger annuities have lower mortality, as in other countries.   There is also 
                                                 
6  Before 1975, base effects make reasonable inflation values difficult to estimate from the Statistics South 
Africa CPI data release.  For the few policies that were purchased before 1975 in our data, we assumed 
inflation until the year 1975 was 5% per year.  This is likely to be a reasonable approximation.   
7  This understates the value of these policies, although the effect is unlikely to be significant. a significant difference between the hazard rates of policyholders of company 1 and 
company 2.  Company 1 policyholders have a hazard rate lower by a factor of 0.9409329.  
This may be because the companies appeal to different segments of the South African 
insurance market, it may be a reflection of regional differences or it may be the result of 
other factors.  It is easier to understand the results for age and duration by visualising 
them than by looking at lists of numbers.  Figure 6 shows the estimated hazard ratios by 
age, along with their confidence intervals.   As expected, hazard ratios increase 
exponentially with age.   
 
The results by duration, illustrated in Figure 7, show an increasing trend with age, with a 
peak at duration 10 and a slight fall thereafter.  The hazard ratio increases from roughly 
0.7 at very short durations to 1.2 at 10 years, the largest hazard ratio, before declining 
back to one by 15 years.  This effect is large relative to the increase in mortality by age: it 
represents the effect on mortality of ageing about 6 years.  If this trend does represent the 
effect of temporary asymmetric information on mortality, it indicates that asymmetric 
information is a significant and material feature of the annuities market in South Africa.  
As the confidence intervals show, a hypothesis test would clearly reject the hypothesis 
that hazard ratios at all ages are equal.  This increasing mortality with duration may 
indicate the presence of adverse selection due to asymmetric information whose 
predictive value declines with time, or there may be some other explanations.   In any 
case, we need to check that the assumptions of the Cox regression model hold before 
reaching any conclusion. 
 
STATA recommends that two tests are performed to check the validity of the assumption 
that the hazard rates of different categories of individuals are indeed proportional over 
time – a global test for the entire data set and a specific test for each variable.   The 
results are shown in Table 3, and indicate that the assumption of proportional hazards 
does not hold in these data: globally, the hypothesis that the data meets the assumption is 
overwhelmingly rejected.  Variable-by-variable tests show that, in particular, the 
company variable and the amounts variable are at fault.  This means that the hazard rates 
of individuals who purchase policies from the two companies have a different pattern in the data (either over age or duration, or both) and that the same is true of individuals who 
purchase large and small annuities.  Weaker deviations from the proportional hazards 
assumption are found for males and females, and the null hypothesis that the proportional 
hazards assumption holds is rejected for a few of the duration and age variables also 
(although we would expect one variable in 20 to fail the hypothesis test even if the null 
were true).  An obvious solution to this problem is to run the model separately for 
different companies and for large and small amounts separately.  The results are shown in 
Tables 5 and 6, and graphically in Figures 6a-d.    
 
The results show striking differences between the hazard rate change by duration, but not 
by age, for the different companies.  One company shows hazard ratios that, except for 
the first year, are essentially level, while the other company shows hazard ratios that 
increase gradually with duration until the 10
th year, when they start to fall again: a large 
number of annuity holders at this company seem to die around their 10
th policy 
anniversaries.  Interestingly, this company sells mainly 10-year guaranteed policies.   At 
least the peak of the hazard ratios around 10 years seems to indicate that there are some 
problems with mortality data collection: if the annuity holder dies before the guarantee 
term expires, the company will continue payment until the end of the guarantee term and 
apparently recorded the date of death, in a few cases, as the end of the guarantee term 
rather than the true date of death
8.   This would cause a consequent lightening of apparent 
mortality before this time, inducing a duration-related positive slope in the hazard rate 
curve.  However, the peak at 10 years seems to be too low to justify the entire slope of 
the curve with duration, indicating that there may be other effects operating.   There do 
not seem to be tremendous differences by amounts between the two companies, although 
the data set is so large that the slight differences that are present may explain the results 
of the statistical tests.  There do not seem to be terribly large differences by age in any of 
the four subgroups of the data, as can be seen in Table 7, which plots the fitted hazard 
ratios by age for all four subgroups of the data.   The Schoenfeld residual tests are unable 
to reject the assumption that the proportional hazards model holds in these data when 
                                                 
8  When asked about this, a representative of the company mentioned that there had in fact been some cases 
where they had permitted this to happen, owing to staff shortages in the department where policy 
movements were processed.      companies and amounts are modelled separately, except for smaller policies in company 
1, where the test indicate that a split by gender is required.  This was done, but the results 
did not differ very much from current results, and so these are not reported.  The null 
hypothesis that the proportional hazard model assumptions hold in these sub-data groups 
could not be rejected and so no further split was performed. 
 
It is difficult to understand these differences in mortality patterns by company, and 
several hypotheses can be postulated.  Firstly, the companies may sell a different mix of 
variable and living annuities.   This would not matter if the annuity market was 
frictionless and policyholders routinely exercised their open-market options on 
retirement.  Evidence from the UK (Association of British Insurers, 2000) shows that 
relatively few policyholders shop around for annuities: most purchase their annuities 
from the insurance company that administered their retirement policy or pension fund 
before retirement.  In South Africa, although pension fund and retirement annuity 
members do have an open market option at retirement (living annuity holders also have 
the right to change insurance companies after retirement), the behaviour pattern of 
retiring individuals is likely to be similar to that in the UK.  This may cause selection-
related effects to differ between companies if each company has a different business mix 
of living and conventional annuities.  Secondly, the business each company receives may 
differ on some other axis that is correlated with the decision to purchase a conventional 
or a living annuity.  A final explanation might be that one of the companies started selling 
living annuities a long time before the other one, which is unlikely given the competitive 
nature of the South African insurance market in the product development area.  One 
common factor underlying all these explanations is that the open market option in South 
Africa does not seem to be preventing market segmentation by insurance company, 
assuming that the duration-related change in hazard rates is not entirely the result of data 
effects in the one company.  This further implies that a study of the effects of asymmetric 
information in any annuities market requires data from more than one insurance 
company.   
 This policy change is of great importance for the study of mandatory annuitisation.  How 
large is the relative market share of living and conventional annuities?  Has the policy 
change had any effect on the mortality rates in the market for conventional annuities?  
How have individuals who purchased living annuities allocated their funds?  How have 
they withdrawn their funds?  Should this change be reversed or imitated in other 
countries?  There is clearly room for much further research. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented an equilibrium model of the annuities market under asymmetric 
information about mortality.  An implication of this model, under some conditions, is that 
if the asymmetric information used to make an annuity purchase at the equilibrium 
annuity price is temporary rather than permanent, as evidence from life insurance data 
suggests it may be, then insurance companies should observe a duration-related increase 
in the mortality of individuals who choose to purchase annuities.  This model was tested 
using South African annuity data.  A policy change in South Africa in the early 1990’s 
allowed individuals to purchase phased-withdrawal type policies with accumulated 
defined contribution and IRA-type balances, rather than just life annuities, as was the 
case before this time.  However, large numbers of policyholders continued to purchase 
traditional life annuities, which allowed this model to be tested.  The results were 
ambiguous.  There were significant differences between the durational pattern of 
mortality hazard ratios between the two companies in the study, which was at least partly 
the result of data problems.  The difference between the companies, if real, suggests that 
South African retirees are not taking advantage of the open-market option at retirement, 
and that the South African annuities market, like the UK market, is not in equilibrium in 
this sense.  If the duration-related trend in the mortality of one company’s annuitants is 
not an artefact of data processing errors, then this may be interpreted as evidence in 
favour of a temporary component in asymmetric information about mortality in the 
annuities market.  A rough calculation would suggest that this asymmetric information 
improves mortality by the equivalent of around 6 years at short policy durations. However, there are other possible explanations for this effect, and an explanation is 
required for the difference in mortality trends between the two companies.   
 
In any case, the effects of the policy change in South Africa have great relevance for any 
country examining mandatory annuitisation provisions, and merit a great deal of further 
study.    In particular, actual and duration-related differences in mortality between 
purchasers of living annuities and conventional annuities in South Africa should be tested 
for, as well as an examination of data sets from UK or US annuity providers, to test for 
duration-related trends in these data sets would be interesting extensions to this work.          
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Table 1:  Data description by policy 
Variable  Number  Mean  Min  Max 
Company  123482  .3066763  0  1 
Male  123482  .6780098  0  1 
Amount  123482  13659.43  100  842922 
Log(Amount)  123482  8.9367  4.60517  13.64463 
YOI<=1989  123482  0.235208  0  1 
YOI=1990  123482  0.044322  0  1 
YOI=1991  123482  0.050979  0  1 
YOI=1992  123482  0.063864  0  1 
YOI=1993  123482  0.067872  0  1 
YOI=1994  123482  0.056024  0  1 
YOI=1995  123482  0.051238  0  1 
YOI=1996  123482  0.057409  0  1 
YOI=1997  123482  0.059952  0  1 
YOI=1998  123482  0.044938  0  1 
YOI=1999  123482  0.062066  0  1 
YOI=2000  123482  0.066625  0  1 
YOI=2001  123482  0.069759  0  1 
YOI=2002  123482  0.069743  0  1 
         
 
Note: YOI = Year of Inception Table 2: Summary statistics for data by policy-year 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     company |    584399    .3226871    .4675045          0          1 
           y |    584399    .0227567    .1491271          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       age55 |    584399      .02532    .1570954          0          1 
       age56 |    584399    .0287184    .1670141          0          1 
       age57 |    584399    .0311671    .1737692          0          1 
       age58 |    584399    .0328936    .1783583          0          1 
       age59 |    584399     .035664    .1854511          0          1 
       age60 |    584399    .0426113    .2019793          0          1 
       age61 |    584399    .0444405    .2060719          0          1 
       age62 |    584399    .0453748     .208125          0          1 
       age63 |    584399    .0454912     .208379          0          1 
       age64 |    584399    .0465367    .2106445          0          1 
       age65 |    584399    .0577054    .2331858          0          1 
       age66 |    584399    .0554467    .2288503          0          1 
       age67 |    584399    .0520911     .222211          0          1 
       age68 |    584399    .0491753    .2162341          0          1 
       age69 |    584399    .0519217    .2218692          0          1 
       age70 |    584399    .0487578    .2153614          0          1 
       age71 |    584399    .0444285    .2060454          0          1 
       age72 |    584399    .0401472    .1963046          0          1 
       age73 |    584399    .0361602    .1866888          0          1 
       age74 |    584399    .0324145    .1770984          0          1 
       age75 |    584399    .0287817    .1671926          0          1 
       age76 |    584399    .0251729    .1566501          0          1 
       age77 |    584399    .0215059    .1450634          0          1 
       age78 |    584399    .0179997    .1329501          0          1 
       age79 |    584399    .0147006    .1203515          0          1 
       age80 |    584399    .0120808    .1092468          0          1 
       age81 |    584399    .0099384    .0991951          0          1 
       age82 |    584399     .008128    .0897884          0          1 
       age83 |    584399    .0067385    .0818117          0          1 
       age84 |    584399    .0049658    .0702932          0          1 
       age85 |    584399    .0035216    .0592383          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        male |    584399    .6776483    .4673772          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        dur0 |    584399    .0796836    .2708029          0          1 
        dur1 |    584399    .0760114    .2650166          0          1 
        dur2 |    584399    .0716634    .2579299          0          1 
        dur3 |    584399    .0700686    .2552628          0          1 
        dur4 |    584399    .0706931    .2563118          0          1 
        dur5 |    584399    .0737185    .2613124          0          1 
        dur6 |    584399     .071162    .2570955          0          1 
        dur7 |    584399    .0675669    .2510014          0          1 
        dur8 |    584399    .0641189    .2449648          0          1 
        dur9 |    584399    .0589939    .2356136          0          1 
       dur10 |    584399    .0513878    .2207877          0          1 
       dur11 |    584399    .0435045    .2039901          0          1 
       dur12 |    584399    .0375976    .1902211          0          1 
       dur13 |    584399    .0323341    .1768859          0          1 
       dur14 |    584399    .0275154    .1635799          0          1 
       dur15 |    584399    .1039803    .3052353          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     yoi1989 |    584399    .2703855    .4441593          0          1 
     yoi1990 |    584399    .0526062    .2232462          0          1 
     yoi1991 |    584399    .0617284    .2406618          0          1 
     yoi1992 |    584399    .0779998    .2681715          0          1 
     yoi1993 |    584399    .0833198    .2763652          0          1 
     yoi1994 |    584399    .0691189    .2536564          0          1 
     yoi1995 |    584399    .0628201    .2426393          0          1 
     yoi1996 |    584399    .0708369    .2565524          0          1 
     yoi1997 |    584399    .0716394    .2578901          0          1 
     yoi1998 |    584399    .0445603    .2063365          0          1 
     yoi1999 |    584399    .0502448    .2184498          0          1 
     yoi2000 |    584399    .0410079    .1983087          0          1      yoi2001 |    584399    .0289956    .1677942          0          1 
     yoi2002 |    584399    .0147365    .1204963          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    year1997 |    584399    .0818721    .2741701          0          1 
    year1998 |    584399    .2415165     .428003          0          1 
    year1999 |    584399    .1543346    .3612695          0          1 
    year2000 |    584399    .1645297    .3707559          0          1 
    year2001 |    584399    .1736742    .3788294          0          1 
    year2002 |    584399    .1840729    .3875439          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Note:   
 
There is one observation for each policy in each policy year.   
company is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the policy is from company 1. 
y is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual died during that policy year. 
agexx is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the individual was aged xx at the most recent policy 
anniversary. 
durxx is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the policy was in force for xx years at the most recent policy 
anniversary. 
yoixxxx is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the policy’s year of inception was xxxx. 
yearxxxx is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the last policy anniversary occurred during year xxxx.  
Table 3:  Results of Cox proportional hazards regression: pooled data 
 
Cox regression -- Breslow method for ties 
 
No. of policies =       123482                     Number of records =  584399 
No. of death    =        13299 
Time at risk    =  493313.5787 
                                                   LR chi2(48)     =   5683.83 
Log likelihood  =   -148596.93                     Prob > chi2     =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          _t | Haz. Ratio   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       age55 |   .2401499   .0228687   -14.98   0.000     .1992624    .2894272 
       age56 |   .3501225   .0347489   -10.57   0.000     .2882306    .4253045 
       age57 |   .4001802   .0355173   -10.32   0.000     .3362859    .4762144 
       age58 |    .482163   .0388201    -9.06   0.000     .4117766    .5645808 
       age59 |   .4964443   .0378093    -9.19   0.000      .427605    .5763658 
       age60 |   .4864291   .0347815   -10.08   0.000     .4228199    .5596077 
       age61 |   .4779248   .0330424   -10.68   0.000      .417359    .5472796 
       age62 |   .5203848   .0345588    -9.84   0.000     .4568738    .5927247 
       age63 |   .5874915   .0372548    -8.39   0.000     .5188288    .6652412 
       age64 |   .6285476   .0383329    -7.61   0.000     .5577332    .7083533 
       age65 |   .6118148    .035721    -8.42   0.000     .5456602    .6859897 
       age66 |   .6174261   .0363611    -8.19   0.000     .5501188    .6929685 
       age67 |    .771436   .0430872    -4.65   0.000     .6914448    .8606811 
       age68 |    .721267   .0417891    -5.64   0.000     .6438413    .8080037 
       age69 |   .7507758   .0424268    -5.07   0.000     .6720604    .8387107 
       age70 |    .923903   .0505007    -1.45   0.148     .8300411    1.028379 
       age72 |   .9892879    .055638    -0.19   0.848     .8860347    1.104574 
       age73 |   1.018257   .0582746     0.32   0.752     .9102135    1.139125 
       age74 |   1.090094   .0624911     1.50   0.132     .9742443     1.21972 
       age75 |   1.205599   .0683116     3.30   0.001     1.078877    1.347204 
       age76 |   1.350394   .0784378     5.17   0.000     1.205086    1.513222 
       age77 |    1.53865   .0913153     7.26   0.000     1.369693     1.72845 
       age78 |   1.683749   .1019663     8.60   0.000     1.495303    1.895943 
       age79 |   1.640693   .1066155     7.62   0.000      1.44449    1.863546 
       age80 |   1.921335   .1278393     9.81   0.000     1.686425    2.188967 
       age81 |   2.128317   .1492232    10.77   0.000     1.855051    2.441838 
       age82 |   2.310241   .1682181    11.50   0.000     2.002986     2.66463 
       age83 |   2.737774   .2024463    13.62   0.000     2.368399    3.164755 
       age84 |   2.622566   .2154364    11.74   0.000     2.232557    3.080706 
       age85 |   2.796203   .2590348    11.10   0.000     2.331927    3.352913 
        dur0 |    .847155   .0486254    -2.89   0.004     .7570163    .9480267 
        dur1 |   .7025083   .0412242    -6.02   0.000     .6261836    .7881361 
        dur2 |   .7652807   .0424732    -4.82   0.000     .6864027     .853223 
        dur3 |   .8569505   .0453124    -2.92   0.004     .7725868    .9505264 
        dur4 |   .8951728   .0450786    -2.20   0.028     .8110406    .9880323 
        dur5 |   .9209735    .044181    -1.72   0.086     .8383265    1.011768 
        dur6 |   .9208739   .0431245    -1.76   0.078     .8401143    1.009397 
        dur7 |   .9405746   .0431713    -1.33   0.182     .8596547    1.029111 
        dur8 |   .9510207   .0431089    -1.11   0.268     .8701733     1.03938 
        dur9 |   1.142047   .0497339     3.05   0.002     1.048615    1.243805 
       dur10 |   1.204748   .0527269     4.26   0.000     1.105714    1.312653 
       dur11 |   1.157054   .0516326     3.27   0.001     1.060155    1.262809 
       dur12 |   1.016671   .0478078     0.35   0.725     .9271576    1.114826 
       dur13 |   1.084668   .0509072     1.73   0.083     .9893431    1.189177 
       dur14 |   .9802528   .0489024    -0.40   0.689     .8889426    1.080942 
     lamount |   .9524708   .0082101    -5.65   0.000     .9365145     .968699 
     company |   .9409329   .0181405    -3.16   0.002     .9060414     .977168 
        male |   2.110209    .049059    32.12   0.000     2.016212    2.208587 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Table 4: Tests of proportional hazards assumption: pooled data 
 
      Test of proportional hazards assumption 
                  |       rho            chi2       df       Prob>chi2 
      ------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
      global test |                    102.54       48         0.0000    
      ------------+--------------------------------------------------- 
      age55       |     -0.01215         1.86        1         0.1728 
      age56       |      0.00896         1.05        1         0.3048 
      age57       |     -0.00424         0.24        1         0.6248 
      age58       |     -0.00788         0.82        1         0.3637 
      age59       |      0.00814         0.89        1         0.3457 
      age60       |      0.00254         0.09        1         0.7685 
      age61       |      0.00862         0.99        1         0.3204 
      age62       |     -0.00415         0.23        1         0.6327 
      age63       |      0.01244         2.06        1         0.1514 
      age64       |      0.00098         0.01        1         0.9097 
      age65       |      0.00832         0.94        1         0.3331 
      age66       |     -0.00022         0.00        1         0.9798 
      age67       |      0.00291         0.11        1         0.7367 
      age68       |     -0.01899         4.80        1         0.0285 
      age69       |      0.00538         0.39        1         0.5347 
      age70       |     -0.00620         0.52        1         0.4720 
      age72       |     -0.00929         1.15        1         0.2835 
      age73       |      0.00261         0.09        1         0.7643 
      age74       |     -0.00496         0.33        1         0.5648 
      age75       |      0.00321         0.14        1         0.7113 
      age76       |     -0.00362         0.17        1         0.6762 
      age77       |     -0.00425         0.24        1         0.6256 
      age78       |     -0.00064         0.01        1         0.9416 
      age79       |     -0.00260         0.09        1         0.7643 
      age80       |      0.00252         0.08        1         0.7722 
      age81       |      0.01870         4.63        1         0.0315 
      age82       |     -0.00349         0.16        1         0.6868 
      age83       |     -0.01054         1.48        1         0.2240 
      age84       |     -0.00586         0.45        1         0.5001 
      age85       |      0.00049         0.00        1         0.9554 
      dur0        |      0.00357         0.17        1         0.6834 
      dur1        |      0.00289         0.11        1         0.7402 
      dur2        |     -0.00081         0.01        1         0.9254 
      dur3        |     -0.00071         0.01        1         0.9346 
      dur4        |     -0.01134         1.71        1         0.1909 
      dur5        |     -0.01676         3.72        1         0.0539 
      dur6        |     -0.00613         0.50        1         0.4799 
      dur7        |     -0.01288         2.19        1         0.1390 
      dur8        |     -0.01243         2.04        1         0.1528 
      dur9        |      0.00262         0.09        1         0.7633 
      dur10       |      0.00998         1.32        1         0.2504 
      dur11       |     -0.01000         1.33        1         0.2490 
      dur12       |     -0.00406         0.22        1         0.6405 
      dur13       |     -0.00415         0.23        1         0.6325 
      dur14       |      0.02914        11.26        1         0.0008 
      lamount     |      0.02371         7.28        1         0.0070 
      company     |      0.03255        14.00        1         0.0002 
      male        |      0.01501         3.06        1         0.0800 
      ------------+--------------------------------------------------- Table 5:  Results of Cox proportional hazards model: by company and amount 
 
  Company 0  Company 0 
  Large Policies  Small Policies  Large Policies  Small Policies 
  Coeff  95% CI:L  95% CI:H  Coeff  95% CI:L  95% CI:H  Coeff  95% CI:L  95% CI:H  Coeff  95% CI:L  95% CI:H 
age55  0.2604894  0.182595  0.371614  0.253457  0.189761  0.338534  0.1657  0.101654  0.270097  0.257472  0.159126  0.416599 
age56  0.4234785  0.292185  0.613769  0.369855  0.27403  0.499187  0.230649  0.140747  0.377976  0.323076  0.191091  0.546222 
age57  0.5666574  0.413991  0.775622  0.382781  0.29034  0.504655  0.257115  0.163958  0.403203  0.37972  0.237434  0.607273 
age58  0.5522254  0.405946  0.751215  0.506056  0.397316  0.644556  0.348126  0.236799  0.511792  0.431158  0.276802  0.671589 
age59  0.4467215  0.329188  0.606219  0.503745  0.3993  0.635509  0.487898  0.348022  0.683992  0.504258  0.338115  0.75204 
age60  0.5230432  0.399624  0.684579  0.535401  0.432561  0.662692  0.416174  0.298762  0.579727  0.289549  0.182764  0.458728 
age61  0.5328168  0.413583  0.686426  0.525406  0.427643  0.645519  0.290444  0.201025  0.41964  0.423939  0.285812  0.62882 
age62  0.5598166  0.438946  0.71397  0.529808  0.432713  0.64869  0.382458  0.273511  0.534802  0.540749  0.376515  0.776619 
age63  0.6808336  0.542722  0.854092  0.556546  0.456719  0.678192  0.516895  0.382119  0.699207  0.535545  0.375388  0.764032 
age64  0.6707947  0.537596  0.836995  0.670529  0.557124  0.807019  0.395797  0.285207  0.549268  0.610168  0.436375  0.853177 
age65  0.6379677  0.515991  0.788778  0.622646  0.518699  0.747424  0.533976  0.404892  0.704213  0.637625  0.46558  0.873245 
age66  0.716233  0.582135  0.881221  0.585522  0.484845  0.707103  0.553931  0.42286  0.725631  0.583452  0.421568  0.807498 
age67  0.8268247  0.677452  1.009133  0.824719  0.692067  0.982798  0.656563  0.506257  0.851494  0.621568  0.450162  0.858239 
age68  0.7972626  0.650018  0.977862  0.684384  0.56696  0.826128  0.627624  0.480612  0.819605  0.78254  0.577755  1.059912 
age69  0.8313112  0.682809  1.01211  0.768593  0.640326  0.922554  0.572622  0.437889  0.748811  0.747443  0.553117  1.01004 
age70  1.069014  0.885781  1.290151  0.923566  0.771405  1.105742  0.746343  0.58261  0.956089  0.855301  0.634122  1.153627 
age72  1.159611  0.958742  1.402564  0.85078  0.697648  1.037525  0.947314  0.744754  1.204967  1.020356  0.759306  1.371154 
age73  1.173194  0.967711  1.422308  0.919657  0.750646  1.12672  0.996904  0.780047  1.274047  0.971774  0.71853  1.314275 
age74  1.189991  0.97923  1.446114  0.938507  0.760973  1.157459  1.10641  0.871087  1.405306  1.244807  0.927883  1.669978 
age75  1.280763  1.057051  1.551821  1.192534  0.969261  1.46724  1.111634  0.876269  1.410218  1.352169  1.012162  1.806393 
age76  1.45158  1.193448  1.765544  1.223073  0.979267  1.527578  1.418538  1.120321  1.796136  1.384534  1.025227  1.869765 
age77  1.841229  1.513486  2.239944  1.355263  1.073675  1.710701  1.386769  1.081157  1.778768  1.593745  1.179035  2.154322 
age78  1.881051  1.533171  2.307866  1.513139  1.188517  1.926426  1.760897  1.382226  2.243309  1.615294  1.18461  2.202561 
age79  2.015213  1.628777  2.493332  1.575229  1.205002  2.059207  1.587968  1.224032  2.060111  1.308601  0.931696  1.837978 
age80  2.112552  1.681718  2.65376  1.743674  1.299988  2.338789  2.154407  1.684306  2.755718  1.461604  1.034463  2.065117 
age81  2.604615  2.061477  3.290853  2.21147  1.625301  3.009041  2.003517  1.534257  2.616303  1.79847  1.260257  2.566538 
age82  2.737719  2.129689  3.519341  2.765954  2.005101  3.81552  2.062916  1.568379  2.71339  2.104235  1.485064  2.98156 
age83  3.102428  2.382199  4.040408  2.008075  1.334349  3.021972  2.779652  2.138759  3.612593  2.756347  1.949653  3.896821 age84  2.577662  1.884665  3.525477  2.123332  1.32999  3.389905  2.799928  2.12354  3.691757  2.54865  1.750998  3.709665 
age85  2.900199  2.041306  4.120477  1.69462  0.892209  3.21868  3.212981  2.394195  4.311781  2.301098  1.477311  3.58425 
dur0  0.6580415  0.529298  0.8181  0.666577  0.545608  0.814366  1.250267  0.978127  1.598124  1.563436  1.184702  2.063247 
dur1  0.5913321  0.475402  0.735533  0.621763  0.507517  0.761727  0.98099  0.770927  1.248291  0.873392  0.64356  1.185302 
dur2  0.6180898  0.502108  0.760862  0.676097  0.558869  0.817914  1.031562  0.816526  1.30323  1.112983  0.83606  1.48163 
dur3  0.6520757  0.535565  0.793934  0.843822  0.703059  1.012769  1.142151  0.915032  1.425644  1.111923  0.843215  1.466261 
dur4  0.9012215  0.757977  1.071537  0.856865  0.71941  1.020582  0.856137  0.676134  1.084061  1.044436  0.802106  1.359978 
dur5  0.8724794  0.738721  1.030458  0.941136  0.797188  1.111075  1.02581  0.82812  1.270693  0.789811  0.60055  1.038717 
dur6  0.8749439  0.74419  1.028672  0.889418  0.753179  1.050301  1.214692  0.995337  1.48239  0.862752  0.669578  1.111656 
dur7  0.9346873  0.800461  1.091421  0.965139  0.819464  1.136709  0.950789  0.772598  1.170076  0.825899  0.646054  1.05581 
dur8  0.8928222  0.764642  1.04249  0.960813  0.815736  1.13169  0.977008  0.7958  1.199478  1.03345  0.826297  1.292536 
dur9  1.049005  0.903392  1.218088  1.250038  1.068177  1.462863  1.254715  1.039177  1.514957  0.981989  0.782107  1.232955 
dur10  1.248951  1.082578  1.440892  1.253924  1.065266  1.475994  1.094866  0.898883  1.333581  1.098082  0.87406  1.37952 
dur11  1.120896  0.966995  1.299292  1.177464  0.991306  1.39858  1.191853  0.99247  1.431292  1.125303  0.892568  1.418722 
dur12  1.025712  0.882823  1.19173  1.080735  0.899405  1.298622  0.985627  0.806721  1.204209  0.923581  0.718312  1.18751 
dur13  1.013364  0.870759  1.179323  1.169633  0.970469  1.40967  0.996776  0.818119  1.214447  1.217398  0.962938  1.539102 
dur14  0.8915051  0.757925  1.048628  1.01823  0.826683  1.25416  1.010833  0.833171  1.226378  1.0588  0.822331  1.363269 
lamount  0.9063258  0.867745  0.946622  0.93596  0.880531  0.994878  0.970658  0.921989  1.021897  1.060627  0.963681  1.167325 
male  2.298077  2.10452  2.509435  2.214898  2.058962  2.382644  1.779445  1.600307  1.978635  1.945618  1.734385  2.182578 
N(Records)  184814      211007      107382      81196     
N(Deaths)  4316      4280      2825      1878     
N(Policies)  38882      46741      21386      16483     
Log Like  -43641.03      -44039.3      -26550.6      -17048.7     




Small policies are policies whose inflation-adjusted annual payment is below the median amount for the whole data set 
95% CI shows the 95% confidence interval for the parameter. Table 6:  Tests of proportional hazards assumption: data by company and amount 
 
  Company 0  Company 1 
  Large Policies  Small Policies  Large Policies  Large Policies 
  rho  chi2  Prob>chi2  rho  chi2  Prob>chi2  rho  chi2  Prob>chi2  rho  chi2  Prob>chi2 
age55  0.01343  0.75  0.386  -0.01941  1.49  0.2229  -0.0279  2.09  0.1484  -0.02089  0.8  0.3699 
age56  0.0223  2.13  0.144  0.01567  1.03  0.3096  -0.00965  0.26  0.6121  -0.00121  0  0.9582 
age57  0.00942  0.38  0.5358  -0.00782  0.26  0.6098  -0.0163  0.74  0.3897  0.00362  0.02  0.8748 
age58  0.00718  0.22  0.6414  -0.00793  0.27  0.6011  -0.0013  0  0.9449  -0.03535  2.35  0.1254 
age59  0.01876  1.51  0.2189  0.00807  0.28  0.5945  0.01331  0.5  0.4778  -0.01513  0.43  0.51 
age60  0.00848  0.31  0.5768  0.02121  1.94  0.1636  -0.02363  1.59  0.2076  -0.02849  1.54  0.2153 
age61  0.01604  1.11  0.2927  0.02697  3.14  0.0765  -0.02245  1.42  0.2337  -0.00253  0.01  0.9134 
age62  0.02472  2.62  0.1054  0.00805  0.28  0.5973  -0.04379  5.38  0.0204  -0.02593  1.26  0.262 
age63  0.04401  8.22  0.0041  0.01889  1.54  0.214  -0.02759  2.15  0.1423  0.00295  0.02  0.8982 
age64  0.01431  0.88  0.3476  0.01876  1.5  0.2203  -0.0172  0.84  0.3602  -0.02916  1.63  0.2023 
age65  0.02941  3.73  0.0536  0.00617  0.17  0.6841  -0.01366  0.55  0.4602  0.00074  0  0.974 
age66  0.02369  2.43  0.1189  0.00574  0.14  0.7079  -0.02885  2.34  0.1261  -0.01142  0.25  0.6185 
age67  0.0286  3.54  0.0598  -0.00012  0  0.9936  -0.0138  0.54  0.4609  0.00725  0.1  0.7536 
age68  -0.00273  0.03  0.8571  -0.02366  2.38  0.1226  -0.02273  1.45  0.2285  -0.02376  1.07  0.3011 
age69  0.03277  4.57  0.0325  -0.01289  0.72  0.3965  -0.00538  0.08  0.7746  0.02109  0.83  0.3633 
age70  0.02105  1.92  0.1654  -0.00994  0.42  0.5146  -0.02627  1.99  0.1584  -0.00765  0.11  0.7382 
age72  -0.00174  0.01  0.9091  -0.01104  0.52  0.4706  -0.00784  0.18  0.6753  -0.01132  0.24  0.6212 
age73  0.01589  1.07  0.3016  -0.00427  0.08  0.7805  -0.01585  0.72  0.3974  0.03118  1.82  0.177 
age74  0.01425  0.88  0.3476  -0.00445  0.09  0.77  -0.01468  0.63  0.4292  -0.02199  0.92  0.3374 
age75  0.02895  3.62  0.0572  -0.00475  0.1  0.7562  -0.01634  0.75  0.3861  -0.00229  0.01  0.9214 
age76  0.0174  1.3  0.2534  -0.01189  0.6  0.4385  -0.01657  0.78  0.3764  -0.01301  0.32  0.5727 
age77  0.01541  1.02  0.3117  -0.00285  0.03  0.8527  -0.0365  3.65  0.0559  0.01543  0.44  0.5085 
age78  0.0025  0.03  0.8695  -0.03238  4.46  0.0346  0.01746  0.87  0.3501  0.00428  0.03  0.852 
age79  0.01924  1.6  0.2059  -0.01269  0.68  0.4084  -0.01858  0.97  0.3236  -0.01482  0.42  0.518 
age80  0.01534  1  0.3168  -0.00886  0.34  0.5625  -0.00405  0.05  0.8291  -0.00672  0.08  0.7719 
age81  0.0336  4.85  0.0277  0.02316  2.29  0.1298  0.02006  1.14  0.286  -0.00436  0.03  0.8518 
age82  0.002  0.02  0.8956  -0.01396  0.84  0.3598  -0.00748  0.16  0.689  0.01088  0.23  0.6344 
age83  -0.00425  0.08  0.7799  -0.00402  0.07  0.7923  -0.02506  1.79  0.1806  -0.00369  0.03  0.8731 age84  0.0024  0.02  0.8745  -0.0215  1.96  0.1618  -0.01635  0.76  0.3823  0.006  0.07  0.7956 
age85  0.01273  0.7  0.4029  -0.01008  0.44  0.5067  -0.00944  0.25  0.6154  0.00739  0.1  0.751 
dur0  0.00307  0.04  0.8432  -0.00823  0.28  0.5947  0.0067  0.13  0.7204  0.03053  1.71  0.1906 
dur1  -0.00388  0.07  0.7976  -0.01596  1.07  0.3011  0.01269  0.46  0.4998  0.03672  2.43  0.1187 
dur2  -0.00887  0.35  0.5556  -0.02676  3.09  0.0787  0.01503  0.64  0.4226  0.0308  1.79  0.1813 
dur3  -0.01778  1.35  0.2461  -0.01583  1.09  0.2975  0.0081  0.18  0.6682  0.02129  0.82  0.3657 
dur4  -0.01854  1.46  0.227  -0.02071  1.88  0.1705  0.00341  0.03  0.8558  -0.01284  0.3  0.5828 
dur5  -0.02305  2.26  0.1326  -0.02827  3.49  0.0619  -0.02784  2.17  0.1408  0.01608  0.49  0.4853 
dur6  -0.00195  0.02  0.8983  -0.02158  1.99  0.1582  -0.01009  0.29  0.5905  0.03775  2.58  0.1082 
dur7  -0.01108  0.52  0.4692  -0.03505  5.29  0.0214  -0.02792  2.23  0.1353  0.0429  3.31  0.0689 
dur8  -0.0337  4.76  0.0291  -0.02365  2.42  0.1197  0.00081  0  0.9651  0.01716  0.54  0.4644 
dur9  -0.00188  0.01  0.9028  -0.01623  1.13  0.2873  0.00387  0.04  0.8344  0.04062  3.04  0.081 
dur10  -0.00751  0.24  0.624  -0.0114  0.57  0.4522  0.04851  6.69  0.0097  0.05375  5.22  0.0223 
dur11  -0.02382  2.42  0.1196  -0.03034  3.96  0.0467  -0.00607  0.1  0.7472  0.05592  5.8  0.016 
dur12  -0.02249  2.15  0.1427  -0.00044  0  0.977  -0.0054  0.08  0.774  0.04654  4.01  0.0453 
dur13  -0.02479  2.63  0.1047  0  0  0.9999  -0.01634  0.77  0.3806  0.03506  2.27  0.1322 
dur14  0.02493  2.65  0.1032  0.00558  0.13  0.714  0.03116  2.69  0.1008  0.07578  10.93  0.0009 
lamount  0.02353  2.41  0.1206  0.04842  10.05  0.0015  -0.00405  0.05  0.8315  0.00129  0  0.9549 
male  0.01017  0.46  0.4971  0.05389  12.68  0.0004  0.0067  0.13  0.7187  -0.03137  1.86  0.1725 
                         
Global Test (47 df)  51.71  0.2951    73.09  0.0087    55.1  0.1949    47.22  0.4637 
 
































Note:  The key shows the age at which the policy was purchased.  The horizontal axis shows age, and the 
vertical axis shows the estimated annual mortality in that year.  The “lumpy” nature of the data is due to the 
method of graduation adopted for the life table, where durations 1-4 were included in one category.   
 
Source: Temporary Assurances (Males) Table TM92, Continuous Mortality Investigation (1999) 








































x  x+1  x+2  x+3  x+4 
DEATH 
END OF INVESTIGATION 
BEGINNING OF INVESTIGATION 
PURCHASE Figure 4a:  Histogram of life-years in each age-duration cell 
 
 
Figure 4b: Histogram of life-years in each age-duration cell (rotated) 
 Figure 5: Negative logarithm of crude death rate in each age-duration cell 
 












































































































































































This appendix derives the steady-state properties of the Markov chain mortality model.   
 
Given the associated probabilities of changing states,  
 
t t h t t t U H q U H H E h l + - - = + ) 1 ( ] , | [ 1 , and similarly,        (A1) 
t t u t t t H U q U H U E l h + - - = + ) 1 ( ] , | [ 1  
 
If the numbers in Ht and Ut are large, then, using the delta method to the second order in 
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This implies that the second-order term is at most of order 
2
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implies that for large Ht + Ut, the following holds: 
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 Therefore, we have an (approximate) transition function for  ] | [ 1 t t x x E + , for large Ht+Ut.   
 
The two conditions for there to be a steady progression to the long-run steady state are: 
 
0 ] 0 | [ 1 > = + t t x x E , and 
0 ] | [ 1 > + t t dx
d x x E
t  
 
If  0 ] 0 | [ 1 < = + t t x x E , then the system will diverge, and if  0 ] | [ 1 < + t t dx
d x x E
t  then there will 
be an oscillating convergence to the steady state.  The first condition clearly holds in our 













.                (A6) 
 
Restated in terms of conditional probabilities, this is: 
 
) & | Pr( ) & | Pr( 1 1 1 1 D X U X H X D X H X H X t t t t t t ¹ = = > ¹ = = + + + + . 
 
If we are willing to assume that individuals don’t change health status too readily then 
this condition is very likely to hold because  ) 1 ( h q - -l  is likely to be large, ￿ is likely to 
be small, and  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( u h q q - @ -  since both are small.  The steady state of the model is 
then easily derived as: 
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